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**ENVELOPE**

(b)(3):10 USC 424

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**HEADER**

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100618Z FEB 94  
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC  
INFO RUEALGX/SAFE

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**CONTROLS**

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

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COORDINATED DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE POSITION.

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SERIAL: MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIGEST (MID) 040-6A

**BODY**

SUBJ: SOUTH AFRICA: POLITICAL VIOLENCE. (U)  
DOI: 9 FEB 94 (AS OF 1730 EST)  
TEXT: 1. ~~(C)~~ SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE TROOPS ARE  
DEPLOYING TO SOME  
OF THE MOST VIOLENT TOWNSHIPS AROUND JOHANNESBURG. THEIR EXPERIENCE  
IN CARRYING OUT THIS DUTY WILL DETERMINE THE FEASIBILITY OF SUCH AN  
APPROACH FOR CURBING THE VIOLENCE IN OTHER TROUBLE SPOTS. THE  
DEPLOYMENT ALSO HAS LONGER TERM IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE ROLE OF

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THE MILITARY.

2. ~~(C)~~ STATE PRESIDENT FREDERIK W. DE KLERK AND AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS (ANC) LEADER NELSON MANDELA ANNOUNCED THEIR LONG-AWAITED EAST RAND PEACE PLAN ON 1 FEBRUARY. ITS OBJECTIVES ARE TWOFOLD: TO IMPOSE LAW AND ORDER IN A HIGHLY VOLATILE REGION, WHERE NEARLY 80 PERCENT OF THE COUNTRY'S RECENT POLITICAL VIOLENCE HAS OCCURRED, AND

TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT THERE.

3. ~~(C)~~ TO ATTAIN THESE OBJECTIVES, THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE (SADF) IS DISPATCHING MAINLY BLACK ARMY TROOPS TO THREE TOWNSHIPS EAST OF JOHANNESBURG--KATLEHONG, TOKOZA, AND VOSLOORUS. THESE SOLDIERS WILL REPLACE THE CONTROVERSIAL AND MAINLY WHITE RIOT POLICE

SQUAD KNOWN AS THE INTERNAL STABILITY UNIT (ISU). MANY ANC SUPPORTERS

VIEW THAT UNIT AS BIASED TOWARD THEIR ADVERSARY, THE ZULU-BASED INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY (IFP). MOST TOWNSHIP VIOLENCE STEMS FROM THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER BETWEEN THESE RIVAL BLACK POLITICAL MOVEMENTS.

4. ~~(C)~~ ALTHOUGH INKATHA'S STRENGTH IS CONCENTRATED IN NATAL PROVINCE,

THE ZULU HOMELAND, IFP MILITANTS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO EXTEND THEIR REACH

INTO TOWNSHIPS AROUND JOHANNESBURG AND ELSEWHERE BY OPERATING FROM THE RELATIVE SAFETY OF MIGRANT WORKER HOSTELS. THESE BARRACKS-LIKE STRUCTURES, FOUND IN MANY INDUSTRIAL AND URBAN CENTERS, HAVE BECOME PARAMILITARY STRONGHOLDS, WHICH GIVE INKATHA CADRES SUPPORT AND SANCTUARY FOR ATTACKING SURROUNDING ANC COMMUNITIES. IN RESPONSE, THE

ANC ORGANIZED VIGILANTE GROUPS KNOWN AS SELF-DEFENSE UNITS. THE RESULTING BLACK-ON-BLACK VIOLENCE HAS POSED A MAJOR CHALLENGE FOR THE

COUNTRY AS IT TRIES TO STEER AS PEACEFULLY AS POSSIBLE TOWARD ITS FIRST MULTIRACIAL ELECTIONS, SLATED FOR LATE APRIL.

5. ~~(C)~~ THUS FAR, THE IFP, UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF CHIEF MANGOSUTHU BUTHELEZI, HAS REJECTED ZULU PARTICIPATION IN THE COMING ELECTIONS AND HAS DENOUNCED THE REPLACEMENT OF THE INTERNAL STABILITY UNIT WITH

THE ARMY. AN IFP SPOKESMAN CLAIMED THAT THE SADF TROOPS ARE OPENLY ALIGNED WITH THE ANC. BUT INKATHA SEES THE INTERNAL STABILITY UNIT AS

SYMPATHETIC TO ITS SECURITY CONCERNS AND AS PROVIDING SOME PROTECTION

AGAINST ATTACKS BY ANC SELF-DEFENSE UNITS ON HOSTELS.

6. ~~(C)~~ ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IS ALSO A MAJOR THEME OF THE EAST RAND PEACE PLAN. IT CALLS FOR RETURNING DISPLACED PEOPLE TO THEIR HOMES AND FOR UPGRADING SERVICES. THE THREE TOWNSHIPS TARGETED IN THE PLAN

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WERE DECLARED DISASTER AREAS--A MOVE THAT ALLOWS THE RELEASE OF GOVERNMENT FUNDS TO THESE COMMUNITIES. EFFORTS TO OBTAIN FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM OTHER ORGANIZATIONS ALSO ARE UNDER WAY. A TASK FORCE TO

IMPLEMENT THE PLAN IS HEADED BY FORMER SOUTH AFRICAN AIR FORCE GEN JAN VAN LOGGERENBERG AND INCLUDES REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE GOVERNMENT, THE ANC, THE NATIONAL PARTY, CIVIC ASSOCIATIONS, TRADE UNIONS, AND BUSINESSES.

7. ~~(C)~~ COMMENT: IF BUTHELEZI AND HIS FOLLOWERS CONTINUE TO RESIST THE

EAST RAND PLAN, SOME CLASHES BETWEEN INKATHA MILITANTS AND SADF TROOPS WILL PROBABLY OCCUR. THE VIOLENCE WOULD THEN ESCALATE, AT LEAST UNTIL THE MILITARY IS ABLE TO ASSERT CONTROL. BEFORE IT CAN ESTABLISH ORDER, HOWEVER, CONSIDERABLE BLOODSHED AND CASUALTIES MIGHT

BE INCURRED ON ALL SIDES, INCLUDING UNINVOLVED CIVILIANS CAUGHT IN THE CROSS FIRE. EVEN AFTER THE FIGHTING, SOME ZULU EXTREMISTS MAY POSE A LINGERING, LOW-LEVEL THREAT TO ARMY PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES.

MOREOVER, THE BITTERNESS GENERATED BY SADF-IFP CLASHES MIGHT FURTHER

COMPLICATE EFFORTS TO BRING THE INKATHA MOVEMENT INTO THE POLITICAL PROCESS.

8. ~~(C)~~ A FAR GREATER THREAT IS LIKELY TO CONFRONT ANY SADF PERSONNEL

DEPLOYED TO THE NATAL REGION. THE IFP RADICALS HAVE MORE ASSETS AND COULD COUNT ON A LARGER MEASURE OF LOCAL SUPPORT FROM THE ZULU COMMUNITIES. MOREOVER, THEY WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO EXPLOIT THE TRIBAL PASSIONS THAT WOULD BE AROUSED BY THE SIGHT OF THE ZULU KINGDOM BEING "INVADED AND OCCUPIED" BY AN OUTSIDE MILITARY FORCE.

9. ~~(C)~~ SADF LEADERS PROBABLY ARE NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT INTERNAL SECURITY TASKS, BUT A DECLINING EXTERNAL THREAT AND EXPANDED DOMESTIC

VIOLENCE HAVE FORCED THEM TO TAKE ON A LARGER ROLE. MOREOVER, THEIR ROLE IS LIKELY TO INCREASE DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD IF FACTIONAL

VIOLENCE ESCALATES AND THE POLICE AND THE STILL-FORMING MULTIPARTY PEACEKEEPING FORCE ARE UNABLE TO ENSURE SECURITY. IN A TIME OF SHRINKING DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, THIS NEW DUTY MAY ENABLE THE SADF TO

RETAIN ITS SHARE OF THE GOVERNMENT BUDGET.

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