


(b)(3) TO USC 424

(b)(3) TO USC 424; (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)

Page 6 Withheld in full



[Redacted] (b)(3) TO USC 424

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FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC

(b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)

(b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)

RUCJACC/USCINCENT MACDILL AFB FL
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(b)(3) TO USC 424

TO RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY

(b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)

RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE/ PRIORITY



(b)(3) TO USC 424; (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)

RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY

RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC/ PRIORITY


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(b)(3) TO USC 424



(b)(3):10 USC 424



(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

SERIAL: (U)

COUNTRY: (U) GHANA (GH); NIGERIA (NI); SENEGAL (SG); BURUNDI (BY); KENYA (KE); SOUTH AFRICA (SF); TANZANIA (TZ).

(b)(3):10 USC 424

SUBJ: ASSESSMENT OF BURUNDI PEACEKEEPING PLAN (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL LIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 20011015.

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i),Sec 1 4(c)

SOURCE: (U)

SUMMARY: ~~(C)~~ HIGHLIGHTS SEVERAL PROBLEMS WITH THE PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE FOR BURUNDI. GHANA ARMY PARTICIPATION IS UNLIKELY UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

(b)(1),Sec 1 4(c)

TEXT: 1. ~~(C)~~

SEVERAL PROBLEMS WITH THE PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE FOR BURUNDI. CHIEF AMONG THESE PROBLEMS IS THE FACT THAT THE PEACE AGREEMENT AMONG WARRING FACTIONS HAS YET TO BE PROPERLY PACKAGED. THE METHOD AGREED TO FOR PUTTING IN THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT LEAVES A LOT TO BE DESIRED. IN ADDITION TO FLAWS HE SEES IN THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENT, THE GENERAL LEVEL OF INSECURITY IN THE COUNTRY REMAINS TOO HIGH FOR A TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE.

(b)(1),Sec 1 4(c)

(b)(1),Sec 1 4(c)

2. ~~(C)~~

(b)(1),Sec 1 4(c)

(b)(3):10 USC 424



(b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(1):Sec. 1.4(c)

[Redacted]

FORWARD FOR AN INTERNATIONAL BURUNDI PEACEKEEPING FORCE. CHAIRED BY FORMER SOUTH AFRICAN PRESIDENT NELSON ((MANDELA)), THE SOUTH AFRICA CONFERENCE ALSO HAD DELEGATIONS FROM SOUTH AFRICA, NIGERIA, AND SENEGAL. IN ADDITION, BURUNDI, TANZANIA, AND KENYA WERE REPRESENTED AT THE MEETINGS.

(b)(1):Sec. 1.4(c)

3. (C) [Redacted] VARIOUS COURSES OF ACTION WERE DISCUSSED AND EACH DELEGATION VOICED MANY CONCERNS DURING MARATHON MEETINGS THAT LASTED AS LONG AS 14 HOURS. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONFERENCE, MANDELA ISSUED A COMMUNIQUE ON THE CONFERENCE RESULTS, WHICH,

[Redacted]

(b)(1):Sec. 1.4(c)

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

SERIAL: (U) [Redacted]
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(b)(3):10 USC 424

SUBJ: [Redacted] ASSESSMENT OF BURUNDI PEACEKEEPING PLAN (U) REPRESENTED THE VIEWS OF THE PARTIES TO THE CONFERENCE.)

(b)(1):Sec. 1.4(c)

4. (C) [Redacted] THE CONFERENCE "SETTLED" ON A COURSE OF ACTION IN WHICH, EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF A CEASEFIRE, THE BURUNDI TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD TAKE EFFECT ON 1 NOVEMBER. UNDER THIS COURSE OF ACTION, 250 TROOPS FROM OUTSIDE OF BURUNDI WOULD COME TO SERVE AS A PROTECTION FORCE FOR BURUNDI POLITICIANS. THE TROOPS, UNDER A SIX-MONTH INITIAL MANDATE, WOULD SERVE UNDER THE BURUNDI ARMED FORCES COMMANDER.

(b)(1):Sec. 1.4(c)

5. (C) [Redacted] THE "SETTLED" COURSE OF ACTION VIOLATES ALL KNOWN PRINCIPLES OF NEUTRALITY AND IMPARTIALITY INHERENT IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS. THE BURUNDI ARMED FORCES COMMANDER IS AN INTERESTED PARTY IN THE BURUNDI CONFLICT. [Redacted] CANNOT IMAGINE THAT THE BURUNDI ARMED FORCES COMMANDER, A TUTSI, CAN IMPARTIALLY DIRECT THE PROTECTION OF HUTU POLITICIANS. THEREFORE, A NEUTRAL FORCE SHOULD NOT LOGICALLY FALL UNDER THE BURUNDI ARMED FORCES COMMANDER'S AUTHORITY. BY FALLING UNDER THE COMMAND OF AN INTERESTED PARTY, THE PEACEKEEPING FORCE LOSES ITS IMPARTIAL STATUS IN THE EYES OF OTHER (INTERESTED) PARTIES.

(b)(1):Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(1):Sec. 1.4(c)

6. (C) [Redacted] COMMAND AND CONTROL IS A CRITICAL ISSUE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE. THE FORCE COMMANDER MUST HAVE THE AUTHORITY AND ABILITY

(b)(3):10 USC 424

[Redacted]

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

TO MOVE AND DEPLOY ELEMENTS AS HE SEES FIT IN AN IMPARTIAL MANNER. THE BURUNDI PEACEKEEPING FORCE WILL HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO TRAIN BURUNDI MILITARY PERSONNEL, BUT WHO WILL THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE BE TRAINING? UNDER THE PRESENT ARRANGEMENT, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT BURUNDIANS TRAINED BY THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE WILL HAVE BEEN SELECTED IN AN IMPARTIAL MANNER.

[Redacted]

(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(c)

7.-(C)-ANOTHER PROBLEM WITH THE CURRENT PLAN FOR AN INITIAL INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE IS ITS SIZE, WHICH WAS DETERMINED TO BE 250. THIS SIZE FORCE IS FAR TOO SMALL FOR THE SIZE AND CURRENT LEVEL OF INSECURITY IN BURUNDI, [Redacted] THE PLAN ONLY ADDRESSES PROTECTION OF POLITICIANS IN URBAN AREAS, BUT NEGLECTS THE FACT THAT CIVIL WAR CONTINUES IN THE COUNTRYSIDE (AND IS ENCROACHING ON URBAN AREAS).

(b) (1),Sec. 1.4(c)

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(b)(3) 10 USC 424

SERIAL: (U) [Redacted]
COUNTRY: (U) GHANA (GH); NIGERIA (NI); SENEGAL (SG); BURUNDI (BY); KENYA (KE); SOUTH AFRICA (SF); TANZANIA (TZ).

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

[Redacted] ASSESSMENT OF BURUNDI PEACEKEEPING PLAN (U)

8.-(C)-YET ANOTHER PROBLEM WITH THE PLAN DISCUSSED IN SOUTH AFRICA IS THE SIX-MONTH MANDATE. IT MAKES NO SENSE TO PLA FOR A SIX-MONTH FORCE DEPLOYMENT WHILE THE PLANED DURATION FOR THE TRANSTIONAL GOVERNMENT IS EIGHTEEN MONTHS.

[Redacted]

(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(c)

GHANA WILL "WAIT AND SEE" HOW THE SITUATION DEVELOPS. HOWEVER, PERHAPS ANEVEN MORE IMPORTANT REASON THAT [Redacted] CANNOT SUPPORT DEPLOYMENT OF A GHANAIAIN FORCE TO BURUNDI IS BECAUSE THE GHANA ARMY IS OVERSTRETCHED.

(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(c)

[Redacted]

(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(c)

[Redacted]

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

(b)(3):10 USC 424

"SLEDGEHAMMER" APPROACH IN HIS ROLE AS THE PRINCIPAL MEDIATOR TO THE BURUNDI CONFLICT. MANDELA VIEWS THE SITUATION IN BURUNDI LIKE A STICK IN WATER. EVEN THOUGH EVERYBODY KNOWS THAT THE STICK IS STRAIGHT AND RIGID, MANDELA CLAIMS THE STICK IS BENT AND FLEXIBLE BECAUSE THAT IS THE WAY THE STICK APPEARS TO THE EYE.

(b)(1):Sec. 1.4(c)

MANDELA HAS PUBLICLY HUMILIATED BURUNDI'S PRESIDENT ((BUYOYA)), RANTING THAT BUYOYA IS UNDEMOCRATIC, RATHER THAN SIMPLY ACCEPTING THE REALITY THAT BUYOYA IS A MAJOR PLAYER (WITH WHOM TO BE RECKONED).

(b)(1):Sec. 1.4(c)

11. (C) THE RESULTS OF AN INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT TEAM THAT CONCLUDED ITS MISSION IN BURUNDI IN OCTOBER WERE DISCOURAGING. BURUNDIAN PEOPLE, ACCORDING TO THE TEAM FINDINGS, DON'T UNDERSTAND WHAT THE PEACE PLAN IS ALL ABOUT. THEY ARE CONFUSED BY THE MULTITUDE OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND MOVEMENTS. THEY DON'T UNDERSTAND WHY AN INTERNATIONAL MILITARY FORCE SHOULD ONLY PROTECT POLITICIANS IN THE CAPITAL, BUT LEAVE THE REST OF THE COUNTRY RAVAGED BY FIGHTING.

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

SERIAL [REDACTED]
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(b)(3):10 USC 424

SUBJ: [REDACTED] ASSESSMENT OF BURUNDI PEACEKEEPING PLAN (U)

(b)(1);(b)(3):10 USC 424;Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(3):10 USC 424