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23 February 1962

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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POLITICAL TRENDS IN SOUTH AFRICA Page 9

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


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
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


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
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


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


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
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DEVELOPMENTS IN FRENCH LABOR



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SINO-SOVIET CLASH OVER DISARMAMENT



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CHINESE COMMUNIST GRAIN PURCHASES




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BLOC-YUGOSLAV ECONOMIC RELATIONS




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COMMUNIST BLOC AID TO UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES



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
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COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN HAITI




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
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WEST GERMAN ACTIVITY IN AFRICA



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WEST GERMAN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN AFRICA




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THE SOVIET ANTIRELIGIOUS CAMPAIGN



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


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


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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

POLITICAL TRENDS IN SOUTH AFRICA

The past year has revealed two divergent trends in South Africa. The Verwoerd government, having attained last May its long-sought goal of establishing a republic and having increased its parliamentary strength in elections the following October, is pushing ahead with its policy of separate racial development (apartheid). Nonwhites, frustrated by the lack of an effective political voice and by the government's security measures, are being drawn toward illegal activities such as sabotage. Both trends are gradual, but they overshadow the efforts of moderates of all races.

White Politics

Verwoerd's Nationalist party for more than a year has had a clear majority of popular support--the first such majority since it came to power in 1948. Gerrymandering and a disproportionate number of rural constituencies have increased its representation in the House of Assembly--the lower house of the legislature --to 105 out of 160 seats.

Nationalist power is based on the cohesiveness of the Afrikaner community, which comprises 60 percent of the white population. The number of non-Nationalist Afrikaners is gradually increasing, particularly in the cities, and there are differences within the community--between doctrinaire defenders of Afrikaner culture in the Transvaal and easygoing pragmatists in Cape Province, and to some extent between rank-and-file conservatives and relatively liberal industrial and religious leaders within each region. However, the various Afrikaner groups have generally united under pressure, and the community's cohesiveness shows no sign of diminishing, even though its political and

social goals have been largely achieved. As the Afrikaners have a higher birthrate and a higher percentage of young people than the English-speaking South Africans, Afrikaner political dominance of the white community is likely to increase.

Verwoerd's white opponents are disorganized and unsure of themselves. The main opposition group, the United party (UP), has never overcome the handicaps resulting from the disparate character of its support: it must appeal to die-hard Empire loyalists in Natal and to renegade Afrikaners in Transvaal and Cape Province cities, to relative liberals, and to extreme conservatives whose racial ideas are almost indistinguishable from those of the Nationalists. The UP's program of "racial federation under white leadership" is designed to paper over these differences. Many of the party's leaders, taking their cue from the surprisingly good showing made by the small Progressive party last October, feel the UP should move in a liberal direction; any effort to promote such a trend, however, would appear fruitless, inasmuch as a large majority of the electorate is already more conservative than the UP program.

The Progressives, who include some of the best minds in the country, are considered by both Afrikaners and Africans to be an "honest" opposition, in contrast to the UP, whose racial policy they feel is hypocritical. But the Progressive demand for a nonracial franchise based on high educational and financial standards not only is far too liberal for the mass of the white electorate but fails by a wide margin to meet African desires. The small Liberal party, which campaigns on a "one man - one vote" platform, has even less influence in white politics.

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Foreign Policy

The government has gradually become more aggressive toward its foreign critics. One manifestation of this was Foreign Minister Louw's intransigent attitude during the UN General Assembly's discussion of apartheid last October --an attitude for which his government was censured by the assembly in an unprecedented action. This year's apartheid resolution in the UN narrowly avoided a clause asking member states to take sanctions against South Africa.

The republic took a similar line--and received a similarly strong rebuke--during the General Assembly's debate on South-West Africa, the former German territory which South Africa received as a mandate from the League of Nations after World War I and which it refuses to place under UN trusteeship. Afro-Asian states can be expected to attack South Africa vigorously on this issue and are challenging the republic's rather shaky legal frontier in the International Court of Justice.

The South African Government remains concerned over developments in the territories bordering it to the north--the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland as well as Angola and Mozambique--and probably would respond quickly with help if it were asked to do so; so far, the governments concerned have not been able to overcome their distrust of each other to do any formal planning toward a "fortress southern Africa."

Implementation of Apartheid

Overseas opinion and developments elsewhere in Africa apparently have moved the Nationalists to give apartheid the best possible face. They are rapidly implementing a long-dormant program for seven rural territories--popularly called "Bantustans"--to administer the country's 11,000,000 Africans through their tribal leaders. Three such territorial authorities apparently are in operation, and the other four are to be set up this year.

The 3,000,000 urban Africans, many of whom have never seen their tribal homeland, apparently are to receive a degree of local self-government, but their political institutions reportedly are to be part of the "Bantustan" system. The government is also working out schemes to give some self-government to the colored (mixed blood) and Indian communities, although a majority of both groups live in small communities within urban areas and lack a "national homeland" within the country.

Verwoerd has said that the "Bantustans" may eventually attain independence. There is no sign, however, that the government is willing to risk losing the support of the white electorate by spending the money necessary to make the poverty-stricken African areas viable, or that its efforts to stimulate private white investment along the borders of these areas have borne much fruit.

Moreover, the establishment of African political institutions, even if they are dominated by "safe," conservative leaders, creates potential

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centers of discontent which may prove hard to control. Last year a group of chiefs in one territorial authority actually requested the independence promised by Verwoerd, thereby causing some consternation in government circles before the chiefs were dissuaded by their territory's own conservative majority. Faced with a determined effort by the government to channel their political activity, however, urban Africans in particular are likely to become increasingly sympathetic to extremists who assert that violence--particularly sabotage--is the only possible way to work changes.

African Politics

African communities in the cities are active, but the government's security measures have disrupted some organizations and led the other to operate with greater secrecy. It appears the "congresses" which until a year and a half ago dominated what politics there was among the Africans have been reduced to virtual impotence, but that small groups--including several known Communists--have been operating with relative efficiency.

The Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) has shown no recent sign of activity, either overt or covert, and its organization seems to have disappeared except in African communities around Cape Town. There are some who still espouse the PAC's "Africa-for-the-Africans" slogan, which has considerably more potential rallying power than anything espoused by the PAC's rivals. None of its leaders, however, has shown the ability to build up a responsive following in the face of government counter-measures.

The hard core of the PAC's main competitor, the African

National Congress (ANC), seems to have fared somewhat better. The ANC's leaders have a longer history of organizational and conspiratorial work, and they have benefited from the tutelage of whites and Indians in the so-called "Congress Movement"--an alliance of organizations, most of them Communist-dominated, which claim to represent various South African racial and economic groups. The movement itself is troubled by factionalism, but a caure of its leaders, operating outside the main organizational structure, probably is responsible for many of the bombings in South Africa since last September.

This group calls itself the National Liberation Committee. Its known leaders include two Africans, Nelson Mandela and Duma Nokwe, and two whites, Benjamin Turok and Raymond Strachan. All have long been associated with Communism. Strachan, described by an acquaintance as a "benign, well-balanced" Communist, is under arrest. The police believe he supervised the making of the bombs which were set off in Port Elisabeth and Johannesburg in mid-December. Mandela, who lived under cover in South Africa and Basutoland after the failure of the general strike he called last May, has left the country

The Mandela group's main sources of aid from abroad reportedly are Cairo, Accra, and radical--but not necessarily Communist--groups in London. These cities are the centers for the operation of the "South African United Front," an amalgamation of exiles from both the ANC and the PAC. Factionalism has made this grouping ineffective, however--the PAC

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
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exiles themselves are split into pro-Ghana and pro-Nigeria factions--and most of the covert antigovernment activity in South Africa probably bypasses it.



Aid obtained abroad reportedly is channeled through Bantoland and Swaziland, two British High Commission territories where African nationalists opposed to South Africa are becoming increasingly active.

So far sabotage has been well planned but poorly executed. One African has been killed and another wounded by a prematurely exploding bomb, and those bombs which did go off properly achieved far less than the maximum possible damage. Even inept sabotage, however, is likely to have some effect on the whites, many of whom feel that their backs are against the wall. Moreover, the saboteurs can be expected to improve in proficiency with practice and further training abroad. The ANC's efforts probably will be supplemented by other groups attempting sabotage on their own, as seems to have happened early in January in Cape Town. Finally, Africans probably will not be the only perpetrators; many of the coloreds, who until recently were fearful of antagonizing the whites, have been alienated by the government's policy toward them and are showing greater interest in extra-legal activities.

Government Security Measures

with a harsh anti-sabotage law sched-

uled to be enacted in this session of parliament, the government probably can keep the underground harassed and disorganized. It will not be able to stamp out the subversive groups, however, and sporadic outbreaks of bombings can be expected.

The buildup of the republic's security is continuing. The police are being reorganized to increase their efficiency, and the government plans to build three new munitions factories to supplement the country's already sizable armaments production.

Cutlook

Verwoerd and the policies for which he is the strongest spokesman cannot be successfully challenged by whites until something weakens his two chief supports: the unity of the Afrikaners and the racial conservatism of the white population as a whole. Such a weakening might come about through a serious economic decline; South African exiles have been urging economic sanctions by other governments to bring this about. The effect of such sanctions, however, would be lessened by the fact that gold accounts for more than a third of the value of South Africa's exports and could not be controlled by any sanctions resolution.

The republic's security forces seem capable of preventing any violent outbreaks from endangering the white-dominated political structure. Behind this shelter the Nationalist government apparently plans to push ahead with more rather than less apartheid. With the dominant white party and the increasingly dominant African group seemingly set in their ways, efforts to bridge the gap between them are likely to be more and more futile.

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
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


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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

23 February 1962


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC Page 18



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
SPECIAL ARTICLES

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THE SOVIET ANTIRELIGIOUS CAMPAIGN Page 5



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POLITICAL TRENDS IN SOUTH AFRICA Page 9

The past year has revealed two divergent trends in South Africa. The Verwoerd government, having attained last May its long-sought goal of establishing a republic, and having increased its parliamentary strength in elections the following October, is pushing ahead with its policy of separate racial development. Nonwhites, frustrated by lack of an effective political voice and by the government's security measures, are being drawn toward illegal activities such as sabotage. Both trends are gradual, but they overshadow the efforts of moderates of all races. (Secret Noform)

WITH DELETIONS

Delete entire section under subhead "African Politics", 1st part under subhead "Government security measures", + no form.

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